Introduction
A central theme in F. A. Hayek's work is the contrast between principles and expediency, and the insistence that governments follow abstract general principles rather than pursue apparently expedient social and economic policies that seek to make us better off. 2 This is a radical and striking thesis, especially from an economist: governments should abjure the pursuit of social and economic policies that aim to improve welfare and, instead, adhere to moral principles. In this chapter I defend this radical claim. I begin by explicating and defending Hayek's argument against the pursuit of expediency based on his analysis of economic and social complexity. I then turn to a rather more critical examination of his evolutionary account of moral principles.
The Characteristics of Complex Phenomena
Hayek is famous (in some quarters, infamous) for his idea of a spontaneous order. A spontaneous order is a "grown order":
Its degree of complexity is not limited to what a human mind can muster. Its existence need not manifest itself to our senses but may be based on purely abstract relations which we can only mentally reconstruct. And not having been made it cannot legitimately be said to have a particular purpose, although our awareness of its existence may be extremely important for the successful pursuit of a great variety of different purposes. 3 Although spontaneous orders also may be complex, they need not be. 4 Crucial to Hayek's analysis of economic and social orders is that they are not only spontaneous, but also complex. Indeed, although most readings of Hayek stress the idea of a spontaneous order, I believe Hayek's great contribution to social and political theory is the notion of an organized complexity, and it is this idea that poses the biggest challenge for expediency as the aim of social policy. Hayek's analysis of social complexity, especially the complexity of economic systems, points to eight elements, which remain part of current analyses of complexity. 5 (i) Complex phenomena, according to Hayek, display abstract patterns composed of a large number of variables. 6 Although the sheer number of elements may figure into an analysis of complexity (see emergent properties under the next point), nonlinearity and path dependency are more fundamental, as Hayek's own work suggests. 7 (ii) Organized complexity occurs "when the character of the structures showing it depends not only on the properties of the individual elements of which they are composed, and the relative frequency with which they occur, but also on the manner in which the individual elements are connected with each other." 8 Hayek thus recognizes the crucial notion of an emergent property:
The "emergence" of "new" patterns as a result in the number of elements between which simple relations exist means that this larger structure as a whole will possess certain general or abstract features which will recur independently of the particular values of the individual data, so long as the general structure (as described, e.g., by an algebraic equation) is preserved. Such "wholes," defined in terms of certain general
The basic idea, then, is that a large number of variables may interact in complex ways, such that they give rise to patterns that constitute "wholes" that are distinctive complex phenomena, which have properties that are not reducible to the particular properties of each element. 10 Contemporary complexity theorists thus, for example, see liquidity as an emergent property of a huge number of related water molecules; although liquidity is a property that causally arises out of the interaction of billions of individual molecules, the precise properties of waves and ripples cannot be predicted from what we know about molecular chemistry. 11 (iii) Complex systems can be tightly coupled. 12 As Hayek notes, in a complex system the state of the system at any one time depends on a number of factors, and if even one is varied, there may be profound changes throughout the system. 13 The behavior of tightly coupled systems is difficult to predict as they are characterized by error inflation: a small error in predicting one variable can lead to drastic errors in predicting the overall system's state. 14 The combination of complexity and tight coupling is especially troublesome to successful manipulation of the system: "Complexity makes it impossible for anyone to understand how the system might act; tight coupling spreads problems once they begin." (iv) Closely related to this is the sensitivity of the system to the initial conditions; slight differences in the initial conditions of the elements can result in very different system states. 16 Hayek is clear that a decisive factor determining the state of any spontaneous order is crucially dependent on the "initial position" of the elements. 17 (v) Complex systems often display micro unpredictability with some range of macro predictability (this is closely tied to emergent properties, point
[ii]). 18 This is crucial in understanding Hayek's conception of social complexity. It was no part of Hayek's intention to argue that economies or societies are too complex to predict, or that we could not possess a predictive social science. His claim, rather, was that in complex systems the only successful predictions will be "pattern predictions," not predictions of specific states of the system at particular times. 19 That is, we can predict a certain "range of possibilities" for the system or, we might say, parameters within which the system will settle. Thus Hayek insisted that theories of complex phenomena were testable as they predict a range of possible system states. 20 However, because of the nonlinearity of the relations in the system, there is no unique solution; only predictions of ranges of possibilities are feasible. 21 (vi) In many complex systems we cannot measure how close the system is to equilibrium, though we have good grounds to suppose it is never in equilibrium. The most our theories can do is tell how the system moves toward equilibrium. 22 Thus our theories of equilibrium (say, price theory) will not allow us to reliably predict actual prices. 23 (vii) Complex systems such as the economy are characterized by constant novelty. 24 We need to remember that Hayek, like the Austrian school of economics in general, insisted on the importance of dynamic and unknown factors in economic life. "The solution of the economic problem of society . . . is always a voyage of exploration into the unknown, an attempt to discover new ways of doing things better than they have been done before." 25 Although mainstream economics generally has been critical of this emphasis on the novelty of entrepreneurship in Austrian economics, understanding the differing effects of predictable and unpredictable developments has been the core of rational expectations theory. 26 One of the main reasons the economic system is characterized by novelty is that economic agents make, and change, their own predictions of the future behavior of others; the economy is a system of mutually adjusting expectations. Hence, it appears that "the equations of economic models will not remain invariant to policy; in other words, economic models will change as different policies are implemented." 27 Because an economic agent adjusts to economic models predicting his behavior, mere knowledge of a model changes behavior.
(viii) Because of the complexity of the system, there is "no global controller that can exploit all opportunities or interactions." 28 This brings us to the very heart of Hayek's economics: global planners cannot secure and employ sufficient information to direct individuals to employ their capital and labor in a way that will tend to a social optimum. 29 This was the crux of Hayek's position in the socialist calculation debate: "The 'data' from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society 'given' to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never be so given." 30
Politico-Economic Complexity and the Perils of Expediency: No Fine-Grained Predictions, No Sound Basis for Expedient Policies
In Hayek's eyes the economy and, more generally, the social order, is a complex system. As we can see from point (iv) above, understanding the economy as a complex system is consistent with a science of economics that generates testable propositions. But these propositions will concern a range of possible states of the system or, rather, "a range of values" of key variables in the model. 31 However, as Hayek himself stressed-and some contemporary proponents of economic complexity have agreed-complexity renders economic models less empirically testable than under a naive understanding of classical economic models. 32 (However, it is important to stress that it is only in relation to a "naive" view of classical economics that the contrast is striking: there is remarkably little empirical testing of economic models.) 33 In any event, Hayek's conclusion is that our best economic models will not provide the fine-grained predictions we would need for effective, expedient economic policy. And it is widely agreed that "[e]conomists need to be able to predict . . . because predictions are necessary if they are to fulfill the role of providing policy advice." 34 We need to be careful here: Hayek suggests two types of arguments against detailed economic predictions.
In the first argument, based on the ideas of path-dependency (feature 35 Given the property of nonlinearity, even given detailed knowledge, sound predictions will not identify a unique future system state (a range of values can satisfy the relevant equations). Although defenders of Hayek wish to stress that he is not simply skeptical about economic knowledge, this is but half true; while he is not totally skeptical, the theory of complex phenomena indicates that predictions are hard to come by.
The second part of Hayek's analysis indicates that the sound predictions we might generate will not concern the specific future states of the micro elements (e.g., economic agents) in an economic system. Call this the No Gaus, Social Complexity/7 Fine-Grained Predictions Thesis. The analysis of complexity seems to allow for two general types of predictions: (a) the prediction of broad patterns of micro behaviors (people will consume less as price increases), and (b) the prediction of some macro (emergent) properties even though predicting the states of the micro elements on which they rely may be quite beyond us From the perspective of the theory of complexity, the problem with expediency qua, say, utilitarianism, is that it requires extensive predictions of the future states of the micro elements. Remember, the pursuit of utilitarian expediency is not simply committed to some prediction: it must predict the aggregative well-being of the micro agents (individual persons) under any given policy. To see the importance of micro predictions for expediency, assume that we can predict that policy P 1 would produce a growth rate of x percent, but we can only say that this will yield an aggregate welfare w y , where w x <w y <w z , and where w x-w z is some large interval, and cannot predict where in that interval w y will be. But suppose that we are also considering policy P 2 , which can be predicted to lead to growth of x-n percent, and all we can say is that the resulting welfare also will be between w x and w z (say because P 2 will produce less growth but also less congestion). If so, our ability to make accurate system-level predictions is of no avail when seeking expedient (qua aggregative, individual welfare-enhancing) policies. 36 
From Theory to Empirics

Complexity, Tight-Coupling, and Policy: Some Examples of Complexity and the Perils of Prediction
As it has been developed in the past decades, complexity theory is mathematical and computational, involving systems of nonlinear equations.
Hayek's own account was neither, but it too was often abstract. It might help to bring our discussion down to more specific policy problems. Edward Tanner, in his popular book Why Things Bite Back, points out several complicating effects of complexity and tight-coupling for predicting the consequences of changes. Revenge effects are the unintended and unexpected consequences of our actions and policies that tend to nullify them. For example, in the early 1970s, utility companies constructed giant smokestacks (some 1,000 feet high) to meet new local clean air standards; the effect was to push pollution into the upper atmosphere, contributing to acid rain. 37 Similarly, a policy that increases the "efficiency" of hospitals by ensuring that all beds are occupied may increase cross-infections among patients. 38 Rearranging effects occur when actions unexpectedly transfer the target problem to a new area (erosion control on beaches often erodes beaches further along the coast). 39 Repeating effects take place when a successful innovation may encourage people to increase an activity, ultimately producing unexpected harm. Improvements in medical care and coverage, for example, encourage people to undergo more procedures, but all hospital stays have a nonnegligible risk of harm through error. One study concludes that one patient in a hundred is negligently injured; as people enter hospitals for increasingly minor procedures, the number of those "unnecessarily" injured will increase. According to another estimate, avoidable injuries in hospitals cause twice as many deaths each year as highway accidents. 40 Recomplicating effects occur as innovative policies and procedures begin to interact, creating new problems. The growth of government and its policy aims have led to huge recomplicating effects as, for example, policies aiming at growth, environmental protection, and urban renewal, all affect each other, and make it increasingly likely that the intended benefits in one area will be offset by policies in another. And, of course, often our actions have side effects that we could never have foreseen, which render them inexpedient. The agreement of the northern states at the constitutional convention to accept, as the price of union (and the regulation of navigation), the importation of slaves for 20 years, though seen as an expedient compromise at the time, was most unwise in retrospect. Tanner concludes his account of predicting progress and policies by observing " [w] hat is almost a constant, though, is that the real benefits usually are not the ones we expected, and the real perils are not the ones we feared." 41 
Does Economics Accurately Predict?
It is not my ambition to demonstrate that Hayek is correct on these matters; rather, I aim to stress that his theory of complex phenomena is sophisticated, and provides a strong theoretical reason to reject expediency as a basis for policy. Still, many readers tend to think Hayek's account of complexity must be wrong since it is obvious that economics does yield useful policy predictions all the time.
Does it? This is a matter of dispute within economics and the philosophy of economics. Philosophers such as Alex Rosenberg and economists such as Diedre McCloskey insist that economics has been a failure as a predictive science. 42 The empirical evidence as to whether economics accurately predicts is mixed, though even supporters of the progress of economics as an empirical science admit that it has not lived up to earlier expectations. 43 Research does indicate that economists tend to converge on many microeconomic prescriptions, as well as on some important ones in macroeconomics. Richard M. Alston, J. R. Kearl, and Michael B. Vaughan found some consensus on 40 propositions, many of which were concerned with microeconomic policy, with high consensus on some claims such as "tariffs and import quotas usually reduce general economic welfare." 44 Of course consensus among economists does not demonstrate correctness. Alston, Kearl, and Vaughan discovered that the decade in which an economist was trained affects his or her views, suggesting that socialization during graduate school may have an important influence on economists' views throughout their career. 45 At the same time, they found that on half the propositions studied in a 1976 study, the economic consensus had changed in 1992. More disturbing for those who claim that, as a matter of fact, the economics profession displays great consensus on basic lawlike propositions is the phenomena of emerging contrary results. Robert S.
Goldfarb's study of the empirical literature in economics reveals a pattern according to which "first, evidence accumulates to support an empirical result. As time passes, however, contrary results emerge that challenge that result," leading to a regular overturning of apparently established empirical findings. 46 Although better data and more advanced mathematical techniques are a factor in over half the changes, Goldfarb concludes that the instability of empirical economic findings represents "a serious problem for the conscientious economist trying to make warranted inferences from empirical literature in economics. If seemingly established results often provoke the emergence of contradictory findings, the dependability of inferences based on existing literature is weakened." 47 Most striking of all is the recent work of Philip E. Tetlock, who has studied the predictions of experts across a range of political and economic issues. For over a decade Tetlock studied the ability of political and economic experts to predict, among other things, economic performance (growth rates in GDP, inflation, unemployment rates) as well as political developments. 48 Times. Tetlock distinguished two criteria of a good prediction: discrimination (how precise the prediction is) and calibration (how accurate the prediction is). Someone who always makes very general predictions (for example, "a 33% chance of a downward movement in an index") would make a number of accurate predictions (by chance they would be correct one-third of the time), but she would score low on discrimination; someone who predicts "a 80% chance the variable will fall" aims at a precise prediction, but of course she may sacrifice accuracy: she is more apt to go wrong since she istrying to give a precise prediction. On the discrimination measure-how precise the predictions are-the experts and dilettantes would beat a chimpanzee that made predictions by throwing a dart at a board on which the dart can land on "variable will go up," "variable will go down," or "variable will stay the same."
Unfortunately the chimpanzee beats the dilettantes and experts on the accuracy score.
All this is about comparative performance. What about absolute performance? Experts are better, I have said, on the discrimination dimension-they make more precise, if less accurate, predictions than does the chimpanzee. How good are they? The better half of the expert group predicts a meager 18 percent of the variance, the less good group about 14
percent. An average of about 16 percent of the variance is accounted for by expert prediction. 49 On the basis of these findings, Tetlock is forced to concede the crux of the skeptical hypothesis (which he relates to complexity theory): expert prediction and guesswork are essentially the same. 50 
The Complex Complexity of Politico-Economic Systems
We now come to an obvious, major, objection: although economics is complex, so are many natural sciences, including biology. But, it is said, natural science has dealt well with complexity, and its increasingly complex models have not detracted from our ability to predict-quite the opposite, they have enhanced it. 51 Look (the objection continues) at medicine: we have mastered interventions in a complex system, the human body, to obtain our predicted results. Even if we accept that economics is to be understood in terms of complexity, we should not accept that complexity blocks a predictive economic science that can be employed to guide policy. Donald Saari, a mathematician, argues, though, that it is simply false to suppose that the complexity in the natural sciences approaches that of economics:
[W]hat we do know indicates that even the simple models from introductory courses in economics can exhibit dynamical behavior far more complex than anything found in classical physics or biology. In fact, all kinds of complicated dynamics (e.g., involving topological entropy, strange attractors, and even conditions yet to be found) already arise in elementary models that only describe how people exchange goods (a pure exchange model).
Instead of being an anomaly, the mathematical source of this complexity is so common to the social sciences that I suspect it highlights a general problem plaguing these areas. If true, this assertion explains why it is so difficult to achieve progress in the social sciences while underscoring the need for new mathematical tools. 52 ). 54 To cut to the chase (i.e., to omit the mathematics), Sarri shows that the hidden complexity of social science derives from aggregation out of the unlimited variety of preferences, "preferences that define a sufficiently large dimensional domain that, when aggregated, can generate all imaginable forms of pathological behavior." 53 It should be noted that Sarri shows that this should lead to some doubts about the efficacy of Smith's invisible hand (not that it is especially clear just what Smith meant by the idea Insofar as our concern is expedient public policy, the economist's policy advice is given to politicians. However, the political system itself, especially one chosen through elections, is itself chaotic, characterized by similar sources of complexity. As Sarri says of electoral politics: "Beware! Beware of aggregation procedures because, in an unexpected manner, they allow unanticipated outcomes." 55 We thus have a recipe for tremendous unpredictability: a coupling of two highly complex systems, the economic and political. The coupling of complex systems induces recomplicating effects, leading us further into complexity. 56 In Hayekian-level complex systems, novelty and unpredictable innovations are the norm. The level of complexity is thus akin to evolutionary theory, not, say, to physiology. This was a point upon which Hayek himself insisted: "Probably the best illustration of a theory of complex phenomena which is of great value, although it describes merely a general pattern whose detail we can never fill in, is the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection." 57 Evolutionary biologists cannot predict the course of evolution, though they can predict that some developments will not occur, "e.g., that horses suddenly should begin to give birth to young with wings." 58 What evolutionary and economic science can do is uncover the general principles regulating the system, not predict anything that approximates future developments of the systems.
Why Devaluing the Pursuit of Expediency Is Not Sufficient
The Principle of Insufficient Reason
Hayek insists that we should never give in to expediency: "A successful defense of freedom . . . must be dogmatic and make no concessions to expediency, even where it is not possible to show that, besides the known beneficial effects, some particular harmful result would also follow from its infringement." 59 The crux of complexity theory is that our predictions about what will occur are likely to be wrong. There is, then, a very strong case that our interventions are not apt to be expedient because we have radically incomplete knowledge. It is not obvious, though, that a blanket prohibition on the pursuit of expediency is warranted. Is it irrational to act on radically partial knowledge?
To appreciate the problem, suppose we are evaluating two proposed policies that aim at expedient outcomes, P 1 and P 2 . Suppose that we have good reason to assume that the predictable consequences of P 1 will be more expedient than the predictable consequences of P 2 . Hayek argues that in such situations we will ignore all the unpredictable effects and focus on the known benefits, and so will act in ignorance of most of the costs of our choice. 60 But it is not at all clear that this is irrational. If we suppose that in some instance great values are at stake and the power of our predictive theories is such that we have a good grasp of how to achieve those values within some specified range, and we are confident that these values are so great that unforeseen consequences are to be put aside, then perhaps expedient policy can be advocated. After all, in The Constitution of Liberty Hayek himself made concessions to expediency, allowing for, among other policies, state funding of education (including some higher education), public assistance to the very poor, compulsory provision for one's old age, and so on. 61 Even when great values are not at stake, it is uncertain that acting on only the known costs and benefits is irrational. In such cases are we to say that our expected utility calculations are really indeterminate, and so we should ignore utility considerations? Or are we to say that our calculations, uncertain as they are, still yield guidance? Just what it means to say that expected utility calculations are indeterminate, and what is the best response to such indeterminacy, are difficult matters. 62 But consider a simple case.
Suppose as far as we can tell that the expected net utility of P 1 is 1,000 while our best estimate of the expected net value of P 2 is 500; suppose further we know that this is a small fraction of the total costs and benefits of our choice, but these other utilities are entirely unpredictable. Call the latter the unknown, large residue. So our calculations include some small, known costs and benefits and the unknown, large residue. There are two interesting possibilities: the unknown, large residue of P 1 is either (i) greater than P 2 or (ii) less than P 2 . Now at this point some might appeal to the (controversial) principle of insufficient reason that explicitly directs us to treat (i) and (ii) as equally probable; they are mutually exclusive events, and we have no reason to assign different probabilities to them. 63 But if we treat (i) and (ii) as equally probable, then the expected utility of the unknown, large residue of P 1 and P 2 is a wash: it provides no grounds for deciding between them. So then it appears as if the only grounds for deciding between them are the known, even if fairly insignificant, local effects: P 1 beats P 2 on this score (1,000 to 500), so cy. 66 we finally have a ground for choice. However, it now looks as if the Hayekian analyses of complexity and the barriers to prediction make no real difference regarding what we should do: we should do our best with what we know, and what is beyond our knowledge should be ignored.
The Relevance of Rules
So long as our only reasons to choose are reasons of expediency-aiming to bring about good results-there is a plausible case for choosing P 1 even though we are well aware it is only a small improvement on a random choice. This is important: if our only reasons to choose are reasons that aim at producing good results, then even if P 1 has only a miniscule advantage in expediency, we have reason to choose it, though we have firm grounds to doubt that choosing it is likely to turn out better than opting for P 2 . The key to avoiding this is to allow another sort of reasoning: rule-or principle-based reasoning of the sort that is not outcome oriented. 64 We might say that the total set of number of reasons (R t ) to opt for P 1 depend on both the strength of one's reasons of expediency (R e ) and the strength one's rule-or principlebased reasons (R r ). 65 So, we can say R t = (w i )R e + (w 1-i )R r , where w i is a weight between 0 and 1 attached to reasons of expedien Now we can see that if rule-based reasons do not enter into the choice, (the weight for R e = 1), then it is plausible that even the weakest reasons of expediency still determine R t . However, if, as Hayek argues, our reasons of expediency are mightily weak (they will approach, but not equal, zero), and if there are relevant principle-or rule-based reasons, then even rules that are weighted modestly will almost certainly determine R t . This is interesting:
Hayek need not really show that rule-based reasons are terribly strong (i.e., that they always have a high weight attached to them), since his analysis of complexity implies that, at least when it comes to government policy, the value of R e will be so low that even a high weight (say, where R e =9) will not greatly affect R t .
However, Hayek has to show that we have sufficient reasons to abide by rules or principles, so that we can rationally give them some positive weighting in decisions. Consequently, he devotes a good deal of his work to providing the case that we have excellent grounds for following the moral rules and, in general, the traditional norms of our society. 67 The key here is his account of social evolution, to which I now turn.
The Strong Appeal to Cultural Evolution
A Sketch of Hayek's Account
Hayek famously employs an evolutionary account of rules. His theory of social evolution is complex and, as I have argued elsewhere, widely misunderstood; I cannot do justice to it here. 68 A rough sketch will have to suffice.
Hayek's is an account of social, not biological, evolution. That which he sets out to explain is the rise of what he calls "the social order of actions"-the orderly cooperation of different individuals-which he sees as an emergent property of a system of rules.
It is the resulting overall order of actions but not the regularity of the actions of the separate individuals as such which is important for the preservation of the group; and a certain kind of overall order may in the same manner contribute to the survival of the members of the group whatever the particular rules of individual conduct that bring it about. 69 Hayek's fundamental insight is that the success of a society in terms of growth, prosperity, immigration, and the copying of its institutions by others depends on the emergent property of orderly cooperation of different individuals that has a complex relation to the rules of conduct individuals follow. As Hayek says, "The selection process will operate on the order as a whole." 70 This is the "Great Society": an overall spontaneous order of adaptations that allows for coordinated action. Hayek, then, sets out to provide an evolutionary account whereby the rules and institutions that give rise to this order (i.e., this emergent property) are selected via a competition ("in the widest sense") 71 among social orders. The emergent property arises out of a system of rules; therefore the competition among these social orders is determined by their constituent rules and institutions as they operate in specific environments.
"Society can thus exist only if by a process of selection rules have evolved which lead individuals to behave in a manner which makes social life possible." 72 Evolutionary accounts are enormously attractive to complexity theorists.
We have seen that complex systems-such as the order of actions-are too unpredictable for us to design rules that are expedient. Rules arise in an undersigned, spontaneous manner. But what gives us any confidence that these spontaneous rules are worthy of being followed?Hayek's answer is that they have arisen in a competitive environment and the success of our current order depends on them.
To understand our civilisation one must appreciate that the extended order resulted not from human design or intention but spontaneously: it arose from the unintentional conforming to certain traditional and largely moral practices, many of which men tend to dislike, whose significance they usually fail to understand, whose validity they cannot prove, and which have nonetheless fairly rapidly spread by means of an evolutionary selection-the comparative increase of population and wealth-of those groups that happened to follow them. 73 An evolutionary account can claim that, without planning or design, the rules we have are superior (in a sense that we have yet to consider) to at least a Gaus, Social Complexity/19 certain class of past rules, so it would seem that in some sense the rules we have are good rules, having survived a competition with other candidates. 74 And that would show we should take account of the rules in our decisions: they are good moral rules. 75 Moreover, just as the future of complex systems is, except concerning broad patterns, unpredictable, so too is the course of evolution; thus, we seem to have a method of explanation that perfectly suits the development of spontaneous orders. 76 
The Rejection of the Sufficiency Claim
Can some such evolutionary account provide a justification for following the moral rules and principles constituent of our complex order of actions? The most radical view, which I think is ultimately unacceptable, is that if a moral rule has evolved as part of our complex order of actions, then we have good reason to follow it. Having evolved as part of the complex order would be sufficient to give us good reason to follow the rule or principle. Indeed, it looks as if sometimes Hayek almost wants to claim that being the product of social evolution is a sufficient and necessary condition for having good reasons to follow a principle. This, though, would be far too strong, since Hayek does allow for incremental moral reform. Let us focus on the evolutionist's Sufficiency Claim.
To see our way to an evaluation of this claim, let us begin by granting the following:
(a) Given some selection mechanism M, our current system of moral principles has been selected (in a competition with other orders of actions over the course of history).
A selection mechanism is supposed by an evolutionary account that, like Hayek's, conceives of evolution as the outcome of a competition between some units (e.g., genes, individuals, rules, cultures) in an environment. There must be some selection mechanism that determines the outcome of the competition, and so the evolutionary winner at any given time. For present purposes we can leave M unspecified, though we must not forget that Hayek insisted that the selection mechanism for cultural evolution is not the same as in Darwin's account of biological evolution. 77 Claim (a) itself does not provide us with reason to follow a moral principle. Suppose we accept that M has selected an order of actions that includes some rule r. It certainly seems that we can now step back and reflect whether r is mere superstition, or whatever. 78 That a whole set of evolved norms might be very bad is the moral of H. G. Wells's Time Machine. In Wells's novel, postapocalyptic humanity has split into two groups: the Morlock and Eoli. The Morlocks feed, clothe, and then eat the Eoli. These norms-certainly accepted by the Morlocks and to some extent by the Eoli too-had indeed developed during a long process of cultural evolution lasting many centuries, but we (and Wells's time traveler) can see that their entire moral code is deeply objectionable. But perhaps this is too quick a conclusion.
Someone may object that, though of course the Morlock and Eloi norms are immoral to us (and the time traveler), given our evolved norms, we cannot say that they are objectionable, full stop, or from some neutral, objective, point of view. We reject the norms of the Morlock and Eloi in light of our own morality, but (says the objector) this is to simply draw on our own evolution. What we cannot do is to reject our own evolved morality in toto, though we can reject some of our moral rules because, say, they conflict with parts of our evolved morality.
Hayek seems attracted to what I have called the "objector's" position: we can only consider the adequacy of some moral principles in the light of the "giveness" of the others, and that only an ill-advised rationalism would radically question the overall outcome of social evolution. 79 He writes:
It is the submission to undesigned rules and conventions whose significance and importance we largely do not understand, this reverence for the traditional, that the rationalistic type of mind finds so uncongenial, though it is indispensable for the working of a free society. It has its foundation in the insight which David Hume stressed and which is of decisive importance for the antirationalist, evolutionary, tradition-namely, that the "rules of morality are not the conclusions of our reason."
Like all other values, our morals are not a product but a presupposition of reason, part of the ends which the instrument of our intellect has been developed to serve. At any one stage of our evolution the system of values into which we are born supplies the ends which our reason must serve. 80 Hayek advances a radical proposal: morality did not arise out of reason and, indeed, since our reason is itself the product of social evolution, it does not give us an Archimedean point to stand outside of cultural evolution and evaluate its norms. 81 However, even if morality and reason are the product of some process M, it does not follow that reason, having developed, cannot evaluate M. As Anthony O'Hear rightly points out, once our capacities have evolved via M, they may develop and be exercised in ways for which M would never select. 82 Even if, say, our intelligence was selected as a way to obtain better food in competition with other primates, our intelligence could now lead us to go on a hunger strike against the mistreatment of other primates at the local zoo.
What would have to be true for us to accept our evolved moral rules as necessarily worthy of our allegiance? Consider: These assumptions are, of course, so strong that (c), the claim that our rules are the best possible set of rules (though we have no direct reflective access to this), must be set aside. In its place, it would seem that the best we can do is: (f) At each point in the past t, M selected principles at t that were more worthy than the available competing principles, though we cannot know this by inspecting each principle.
It is important that we cannot say either that our present principles are better than all the other principles that have been eliminated or even that our present principles are better than our own past ones. Evolution, as Hayek realized, is path dependent. 84 Suppose that at time t 1 (in environment E 1 ) M selects A over B; at time t 2 (in environment E 2 ), M selects C over A. When we get to t 3 (in environment E 3 ), where M selects D over C, we cannot say that our now-evolved D rule is better than either A or B. Even if we suppose that the environment is stable, if evolution is path dependent in the sense that once a rule is defeated by another it is deleted from the option set, the evolutionary outcome may be inferior to some previously defeated option. 85 Of course, just because path dependence is possible, and so may lead to outcomes inferior to eliminated options, it does not follow that it is common. 86 It is, though, certainly a bar to inferring that later is better than earlier. Moreover, if we suppose that the rate of social change is rapid, we have good grounds for doubting that our current rules are especially good in the current environment. Ex hypothesi, they were selected by M as more worthy than some competitors at t, but if t + n is very different, there is not much of a presumption that the rules are more worthy now, unless we suppose that M operates very quickly. The upshot is this: even if we make the strong assumption that the selection mechanism inherently selects rules we consider worthy, if social change is rapid we cannot conclude our current rules are worthy unless social evolution occurs rapidly. All we can say is that at some point in the past the rules were more worthy than a set of competitors.
Gaus, Social Complexity/24
Even (f) is too strong. Although we might accept that, as a whole, the set of current rules tend to track our reflective conceptions of right and value, it is dubious that this is true of every rule. Even biological evolution produces traits that have no current survival value, and are actually maladaptive (e.g., our appendix), and no doubt cultural evolution does too. 87 If so, then some of our rules may not tend in any way to track our notion of worthy rules. Pace Hayek, even on an evolutionary account some rules might correctly be described as "superstitious" and without any merit whatsoever.
A Modest Defense of Evolutionary Morality
Qualified Rational Deferral to the Outcome of Evolution
We must, I think, reject any claim that just because a rule or principle is the product of social evolution we have good grounds to follow it. What Hayek needs is a justification for an attitude of qualified rational deferral to current moral rules. Overall, a successful Hayekian evolutionary defense of principled moral action must show the following:
(a) A system of rules is necessary.
(b) We cannot rationally construct such a system.
(c) Social evolution can explain the rise of such a system.
(d) Rational reflection indicates that we often ought to follow these evolved rules (partly) because they are the evolved rules of our society.
Let us see how these four claims might be endorsed within a broadly Hayekian framework. Note at this point our discussion is "Hayekean," rather than Hayek's. I will try to show that important themes in Hayek's philosophy support these claims, even though it leads to a more modest evolutionary account of ethics than he proposed.
Claim (a): Complex Systems as Rule Governed
One of Hayek's core claims is that spontaneous complex orders-unplanned complex systems-depend on their elements following certain rules. A spontaneous order is partially characterized by the rules that govern the behavior of its elements, and any such system must be rule-governed. 88 Spontaneous orders, then, arise among humans because we are rulefollowers, and so can develop create systems of cooperation in which we can form reasonable micro expectations about the behavior of others. Such rules need not be conscious; indeed, many are not. 89 Hayek also insists that the system of rules must be abstract, and not aim at "known particular results . . . but is preserved as a means for assisting in the pursuit of a great variety of individual purposes." 90 Given the analysis of complex systems it is clear why the rules cannot aim at "known particular results"-the particular results of the system cannot be known. And given the unpredictability of the system, the rules will have to be applicable to new situations; thus it is plausible that the fundamental ones defining the system will be abstract. So "principle" may be a better term than "rule," as many of these rules are abstract and only implicitly understood. 91 The point here is that complex systems are inherently principle-following; the social order of actions is structured by the principle-guided action of its members. The order of actions cannot persist if each acts solely to maximize his own utility: uncertainty about what is the best course of action, transaction costs, lack of predictability, all conspire to make human societies necessarily rule-governed. The distance between Hayek and neo-Humean game theorists such as Ken Binmore is not nearly as great as we might think: both believe that inherent to the structure of complex human action is settling on shared rules or norms to guide behavior. 92 Principes are necessary to the functioning of complex systems, but such a system of rules cannot be rationally constructed. We cannot rationally construct the best system of principles because we do not have a good grasp of the consequences and interaction effects of the principles that compose the system. Remember that Hayek insists that the order of actions is an emergent property of the system of principles: if so, the basis for social cooperation emerges in a complex way from the entire order of rules and principles.
Consequently, the project of designing a new system would require a depth of knowledge that far exceeds what is available to us. This is the real crux of Hayek's anticonstructivism, and it is solidly grounded in his theory of complexity.
So far, so good. But while Hayek has an overwhelming case against total social reconstruction of the sort envisaged by revolutionary regimes of the twentieth century, it is not at all clear that this account gives us reason to defer to any specific rule or principle because it is the product of social evolution. True, we cannot redesign the entire system ofprinciples, but there seems no reason why we must pay heed to any specific one. One justification for strict rule conformity to every principle can be derived from what we might call the Burkean Fragility Thesis. Implicit in much of Hayek's evolutionary argument is a Burkean "reverence for tradition." Since we cannot know the purposes of our principles, a reformist attitude is apt to alter so many of them that the system will not be able to adapt. If the complex system has limited capacities for adaptation and self-maintenance then, prima facie, it would seem wise not to tinker with it, since almost any significant change might upset its fragile equilibrium, and we have no confidence that it will adapt and move to a new equilibrium. This would indeed instill what Hayek describes as a "reverence for the traditional," for the traditional embodies a difficult-to-achieve social stability. 93 The worry, though, is that if Hayek really embraces the idea that somehow complex systems are fragile, he will, despite his disclaimers, be led from classical liberalism to conservatism. A commitment to fragility leads to precisely what Hayek finds so objectionable about conservatism-a suspicion of, and resistance to, change as such, for all change is a threat to a fragile social order. In contrast, says Hayek, "the liberal position is based on courage and confidence, on a preparedness to let change run its course, even if we cannot predict where it will lead." 94 Indeed, Hayek stresses that complex systems are usually self-maintaining. 95 By this Hayek means that complex systems have a tendency to persist and to respond to a range of exogenous and endogenous changes. 96 Alternatively, we can say that complex systems are adaptive: "the agents in these systems in some sense learn to better deal with their environments. They are continually organizing and reorganizing their building blocks according to the payoffs they receive from the activities." 97 If, though, this is the nature of complex systems, then it is hard to see why it does not apply to moral innovation as well: the self-adaptive characteristic of the social and economic order will respond, in unpredictable ways to be sure, to moral change as it does do to the host of other disturbances to which it is subjected.
Hayek's use of the Burkean case for current moral rules, then, drives him into a dilemma. If the social order really is fragile, so that change and innovation raises the specter of social disintegration, there is a reasonable argument for reverence for current moral rules. But then Hayek's liberalism is itself called into question, for it is premised on the insistence that society can adjust to widespread innovative behavior. 98 We still are searching for the grounds of qualified rational deferral to current moral principles.
Claims (c) and (d): Why We Should Pay Attention to the Results of Social Evolution
If morality is to perform the function of providing rule-based expectations for social interactions, allowing coordination, and so on, it must be publicly known and shared. Philosophers are apt to conceive morality simply as something that is justified, or correct, or true, as if one person could have the only correct view of morality, just as one person might have the only correct view of the type of life on some distant planet. Morality, though, is first and foremost, a practical matter of shared principles that structure complex interactions: principles that are true or the best, but are not shared, simply cannot perform the task of morality in a complex system. For morality to serve its purposes, then, we must coordinate on the same morality. The relevant moral principles on which we act must be a matter of common knowledge: I must know that you are following the common principles and you know that I am, and know that I know that you are. In this sense morality must be public: if moral principles are to perform their task in a complex order, they must be publicly acknowledged. Moral duty is not, in the first instance, a matter of getting things epistemically correct; it is, first and foremost, a practical guarantee about legitimate expectations.
The problem, however, is that it is largely indeterminate which of the many different systems of rules and principles we shall coordinate.
Traditional social contract theory is objectionably constructivist because it seeks to identify a unique set of political principles, or principles of justice, on which rational people must agree. But there are many different possible sets of principles or rules on which we might coordinate. We can think of the A one-shot two-person game can give us an insight, but it is clearly an inadequate way to model the evolution of a morality. The social coordination problem is not a single-play game, but an iterated game with numerous players. We have a number of encounters with others, and each can be understood as a play in a series of impure coordination games. In large, Nperson coordination games with multiple equilibria, a bandwagon effect easily takes over. As Hume observed, the convention grows through "a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it." 99 The key here is the increasing returns to playing the same rule (say, Y): the more people play Y, the more it makes sense for others to play Y, even those who strongly prefer X. The same reasoning that shows why I am now using the qwerty keyboard and Microsoft Windows (the increasing returns of shared keyboards and operating systems) shows how we can all come to accept the same moral principles despite beginning with diverse evaluations. What is fascinating is that increasing returns are often a feature of complex systems-and so the system can go off in very different directions depending on small chance events. 100 For example, if X players tend to be more visible, people may come to think that X is a popular principle, and the more popular people think it is, the more people will be attracted to it, and so X may gain currency and dominate; in slightly different circumstances Y could have dominated. Thus we see how the evolution of coordination itself exhibits complex features.
This does not mean that we must embrace the whole of our morality: we certainly can stand back and evaluate moral principles and refuse to abide by those parts of our social morality that are unjust, inhumane, or unfair. In terms of the coordination game modeling, only if the current coordination is better than no coordination at all should rational individuals continue to embrace it. Thus we can see how it is both rational to embrace the outcome of social evolution (we accept principle Y because it is the evolved rule, even though in our hearts we might think X is better), but we still can have a critical attitude toward current morality. 101 If coordinating on a moral rule is worse than going it alone (coordination is not a Nash equilibrium), individuals will defect and the rule will be weakened, and perhaps, eventually abandoned. We thus have arrived at a justification for what Hayek needs: a qualified rational deference to current moral rules.
Conclusion
I have tried to show here how Hayek's original and insightful analyses of complexity and the evolution of moral principles provide compelling grounds for his striking claim that we ought to follow abstract general principles or rules rather than pursue apparently expedient social and economic policies that aim to make us better off. It is not that the aim of making us better off is not admirable, but in large-scale decisions such as those undertaken by government, we do not have the information to do it. Given how little guidance expediency gives us, we are driven to rely on evolved moral principles. I have argued that, at least at times, Hayek seems to suggest too great a deference to evolved norms. These aspects of Hayek's thought, I have suggested, are both objectionable in themselves and do not fit well with his liberalism and his faith in the dynamic and self-regulating character of the Great Society. However, I have argued that some basic Hayekean themes allow us to construct an account of evolved morality that grounds an attitude of qualified rational deferral to our current evolved moral rules. Thus we can see how rational and reflective individuals who recognize the complex character of their social order ought to embrace Hayek's dictum that they should forgo expediency and generally rely on the evolved principles of their society.
(Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], p. 63) argues that all this is precisely backwards. He claims that while it is certainly true that policy makers do not have access to micro-level predictive knowledge, they do not need it, and that is why expedient public policy is possible. All that policymakers require is aggregate statistical predictions of the overall consequences of the policies; the individual variations will cancel out. This argument for social scientific knowledge goes back to Durkheim. If we can predict how many suicides will occur in a year, we have the basis for an expedient social policy, even if we cannot predict who will commit suicide.
Hayek anticipates this reply, and correctly notes that statistics is "impotent to deal with pattern complexity," because it supposes independence rather than systematic connection:
Statistics . . . deals with the problem of large numbers essentially by eliminating complexity and deliberately treating the individual elements as if they were not systematically connected. It avoids the problem of complexity by substituting for the information on the individual elements information on the frequency with which their different properties occur in classes of such elements, and it deliberately disregards the fact that the relative position of the different elements in a structure matter. ( 
